

# CBA of Mega projects: some teachings from the MOSE project



# Summary


**I. Introduction: high tides and MOSE project**

**II. Extrinsic limitations**


**III. Intrinsic limitations**



Acqua Alta




*Figura 2: eventi di marea uguali o maggiori di +80  
(fonte: Comune di Venezia - Ufficio Maree)*





## Various levels of Acqua Alta

**Venezia altimetria**  
**Comune di Venezia**  
 Istituzione centro previsioni e segnalazioni maree  
 In collaborazione con Insula spa  
 a cura di Leonardo Boato, Paolo Canestrelli, Luisa Facchin e Rudj Todaro  
 aggiornamento 2009 Altimetria Insula

laguna



situazione attuale



a opere realizzate



-  Difese locali, insulae e marginamenti (muree me)
-  Opere mobili (muree eccezionali)


Figura 1: ipotesi esaminate dal SIA - Il sistema (fonte: Consorzio Venezia Nuova)

MOSE :  
principle  
Mobile gates +  
Local defences

# A set of interventions

- Opening of the fish farms,\*
- Reduction of water depth -10, -12, -8 at the inlets LMC\*
- Reconstruction of velme, barene e dossi\*
- Closing of the straight section of the Malamocco Marghera canal and reopening of the Fiesolo canal
- Changes in the orientation of the external dikes in the inlets.

Comune di Venezia 1998, p.II 168



110 cm

# Summary

**I. Introduction: high tides and MOSE project**

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**III. Intrinsic limitations**

### Supra national authorities

UE

### Central authorities

- Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Public Works
- Water Authority

### Operator

CVN

### Justice

Administrative Court

### Local Authorities

- Region
- Province
- Venice Municipality
- Other Municipalities

### Specific Authorities

Special Committee

College of International Experts

SIA (CBA)

Special Commission

Controls

Rejects

Reviews

Reviews

Validates

Reviews

Construction

MCA

1966

1997

1998

1999

2000

2003

2006



# The search for an independent evaluation

## limits

- CBA made by promoter
- Lack of publicity

## warranties

- External experts
- Scrutinized by
  - Colleggio internazionale
  - Commissione del commune di Venezia
  - Ministero
  - Tribunali

**Anchoring bias**


# CBA legitimized ???

- Institutionally : yes
- General public : ?

# CBA outcome (mrd Lire 1998)

	Discount rate = 5%			Discount rate = 3%		
	Scenario A	Scenario B	Scenario C	Scenario A	Scenario B	Scenario C
<b>Costs of the project</b>	<b>3400</b>	<b>3400</b>	<b>3400</b>	<b>3900</b>	<b>3900</b>	<b>3900</b>
<b>Benefits (avoided high water costs)</b>	<b>2980</b>	<b>3550</b>	<b>4480</b>	<b>4050</b>	<b>5000</b>	<b>6650</b>
Avoided short-term costs	390	660	1200	670	1200	2200
Avoided long-term costs	2590	2890	3280	3380	3800	4450
<i>Lagoon shoreline</i>	230	280	340	380	480	580
<i>Low water after flooding</i>	330	330	490	400	400	620
<i>Salt aggression</i>	1780	1830	1890	2300	2400	2550
<i>Drainage system</i>	200	370	460	230	420	550
<i>Others</i>	50	80	100	70	100	150
<b>Net Present Value</b>	<b>-420</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>1080</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>1100</b>	<b>2750</b>
<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>1.28</b>	<b>1.71</b>
<b>High water costs without project</b>	<b>3530</b>	<b>4170</b>	<b>5200</b>	<b>4660</b>	<b>5680</b>	<b>7450</b>
<b>Percentage high-water costs avoided by the project</b>	<b>85%</b>	<b>85%</b>	<b>86%</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>89%</b>

*Table 6. Costs and benefits of the mobile gates project. The costs are the sum of the present value of the construction costs of the mobile gates, of the maintenance costs and of the costs of the "insulae" project*

- 
- I. Introduction
  - II. Extrinsic limitations
  - III. Intrinsic limitations

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
- General modelling approach
- Some visible limitations
- “Conventional” and “banalist” use of CBA
- Defocalisation

# Discretisation

## ■ Discretisation

### 1 - Sea rise

Figure 1. Sea-level rise scenarios and comparison with measured levels in the past century (reproduced from EIS, Section C, Vol.1, Figure C3.1.2.1, page 187). The star marks in the record of Venice indicate the most recent measures (from Cecconi, Canestrelli, Corte and Di Donato, 1998)



- 1 - *Natura non fecit saltum*
- 2 - Arbitrarietà
- 3 - Fuorviante

### 2 - Impact on mobility

### 3 - Damages to stored goods

## ■ Dose response function

# Summary

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


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
# Some items missing

- Costs for harbour activity
- Costs for reduced touristic incomes
- Tourist
  - Fontini et al 2010
    - AA > 120 cm reduces presence of tourists in Venice by 3516 units. ( $t=1,68$   $R^2 = 0,58$ , months used as controls)
- Cost of damages to ZIC





# Scenario definition






Dovrebbero essere  
nello sc. di  
riferimento

**Vs.**

**“Situazione attuale”**  
(p. 162)  
o  
**“opzione 0”: “solo  
interventi in corso”**  
(p. 165)

# Definizione of alternative scenarios



- Nagasaki e Ramspol (NL)

# Risk and uncertainty

- **Failure or catastrophe**
  - (Jonkmann, et al. 2004) NL : evaluation incl. probability of dike failure
- **Discrete representation of uncertainty**
  - Limits technical possibilities of analysis

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# “Conventional”, “banalist” use of CBA

- **GE vs. PE**
- **Modern CBA (Drèze and Stern) neglected**
- **Arbitrary set of markets**
  - No known definition of “standing”
- **Old fashioned view of actualisation**

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
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
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# Defocalisation

- **Quotidianism**
  - **Concentrates on tangible**
    - **Damage to stored goods**
  - **No evaluation of environmental externalities**
    - **Compensation measures**
  - **Close to direct users experience**
    - **Maintenance costs**
    - **Mobility hindrances**
    - **Other techniques neglected : hedonic pricing**
- **Defocalisation ...**



Num. pp.




Rilevanza valutativa (miliardi €) e sforzo analitico  
Risultati provvisori



# Cost ingenuity pseudo neutralism

The construction cost of the mobile gates (as reported in the EIS) is 3700 billion lire. The construction phase (including the preparation of the final design



## 1.a Distribuzione degli scostamenti dei costi




Figure 4.1 – Prevalence of Cost Escalation in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) Optimism Bias Study  
Table 4.2 – Average Cost Escalation by Mode in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) Optimism Bias Study

Fonte: elaborazioni su dati Avcp, periodo 2000-07.

F. Decarolis e G. Palumbo

**Table 0: Applicable capital expenditure optimism bias uplifts**

Category	Types of projects	Applicable optimism bias uplifts	
		50% percentile	80% percentile
Roads	Motorway Trunk roads Local roads Bicycle facilities Pedestrian facilities Park and ride Bus lane schemes Guided buses on wheels	15%	32%
Rail	Metro Light rail Guided buses on tracks Conventional rail High speed rail	40%	57%
Fixed links	Bridges Tunnels	23%	55%

Correction factors for costs

Source: Flyvbjerg, Bent & COWI (2004), "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning: Guidance Document", The British Department for Transport, London, June 2004.

$$\text{Log}Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_k^K \beta_k \text{Log}X_{i,k} + e_i \quad (3)$$

$Y_i$  = Costs Overrun Ratio of project  $i$

$X_1$  = Average annual interest rate change over construction period

$X_2$  = Annual interest rate change

$X_3$  = Project construction duration

$X_4$  = Investment ratio of private sector in total project funding

$X_5$  = Investment ratio of federal government in total project funding

$X_6$  = Private COR bearing

$X_7$  = Public-Private COR risk bearing (a dummy variable)

$X_8$  = Projects' budget

$X_9$  = Project's duration

$e_i$  = Error terms

$K$  = number of explanatory variables

The dummy variables  $X_6$  and  $X_7$  have the value of 1 if both sectors bear the risk; and the value of 0 if only one sector does so.

Berechman e  
Wu 2006

Cost overruns Risk  
Analysis in  
Transportation  
Infrastructure  
Investments

Tavola 8

Scostamenti di costo				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Procedura aggiudicazione</b>				
Asta AB		-3.023 (1.110)***	-3.836 (1.214)***	-2.882 (1.256)**
Asta SR		0.874 (2.692)	-1.021 (2.859)	0.742 (2.943)
Negoziazione	0.034 (0.416)	-2.96 (1.192)**	-4.229 (1.445)***	-2.917 (1.350)**
<b>Caratteristiche del lavoro</b>				
log(Prezzo di riserva)	0.463 (0.167)***	0.382 (0.171)**	0.441 (0.250)*	0.232 (0.202)
Manutenzioni ordinarie	1.273 (0.318)***	1.287 (0.317)***	1.813 (0.472)***	0.544 (0.350)
Restauri opere speciali (OG2)	2.227 (0.446)***	2.244 (0.447)***	1.930 (0.783)**	2.127 (0.468)***
Strade, autostrade e ponti (OG3)	-0.211 (0.293)	-0.219 (0.292)	-0.406 (0.437)	-0.080 (0.304)
Dummy per altri OG e OS	SI	SI	SI	SI
<b>Tipologia di appalto</b>				
Appalto integrato	2.583 (0.532)***	2.398 (0.528)***	1.950 (0.664)***	1.440 (0.609)**
Progetto affidato terzi	-0.190 (0.268)	-0.187 (0.267)	-0.803 (0.414)*	0.149 (0.297)
Progetto aggiudicato terzi	-0.784 (0.334)**	-0.774 (0.333)**	-1.699 (0.475)***	0.044 (0.378)
<b>Caratteristiche della SA</b>				
Provincia	-2.422 (0.666)***	-2.444 (0.666)***	-0.878 (1.159)	
Comune	-2.452 (0.613)***	-2.518 (0.612)***	-0.75 (1.083)	1.961 (0.473)*
Concessionario di rete	-3.517 (1.088)***	-3.425 (1.088)***	-1.464 (1.53)	
Dummy per ogni tipo di SA	SI	SI	SI	NO
Dummy Valle d'Aosta	11.175 (2.536)***	12.192 (1.882)***		8.161 (1.507)***
log(Popolazione)				0.693 (0.100)***
Dummy per ogni regione	SI	SI	SI	SI
Costante	SI	SI	SI	SI
Osservazioni	10468	10468	4973	7844
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04

Standard errors robusti in parentesi. Significatività: \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%.

La  
rinegoziazione  
dei contratti di  
lavori pubblici:  
un'analisi  
teorica e  
empirica,

F. Decarolis e G.  
Palumbo

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## IV. Conclusion

# Conclusions for transport economics

- **Quotidianism**
  - E. Weil
- **Use of “conventional” approach**
- **Risk and uncertainty**
- **Pseudo neutralism of cost ingenuity main cause of distortion**



Thank you for  
your attention